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CRIMINAL LAW COMMENTS AND ABSTRACTS

and conspiracy in Illinois, for example,n may hold
public office, under statutory law, though a conviction for these offenses would be clearly inconsistent with the standards of decency and respect
for the law which the public is entitled to expect
from their elected officials. Conversely, a felony
conviction which vacates a public office may work
an injustice upon an officeholder who, perhaps in
his youth many years before his election, had been
convicted of involuntary manslaughter or other
crime which in no way relates to his qualification
for public office. And if extraterritorial convictions
are to be given strict effect, a man may be removed
from office for conviction of a felony in one state
when that act is only a misdemeanor or even no
crime at all in the state of disqualification.
The practice of singling out certain crimes for
the label of infamy is similarly not without fault.
It was precisely because Colorado had adopted.
this practice that a person convicted of evading
federal income taxes was able to retain his office,

"See ILL. REv. STAT., C. 38, §§80, 138, 139, 162,
492 (1957).

for income tax evsasion was not one of the crime
listed as infamous.40
It is submitted that the adoption of a dual test
of infamy may answer the problem presented.
The "punishment" test, which deems all felonies
infamous, is well suited to those instances where
constitutional provisions demand the protection
of an indictment by the grand jury. As far as the
office disqualification cases are concerned, today,
more than ever before in the history of our country,
the need is great for competency in public office.
That competency, as regards the issue with which
we are here concerned, should be determined by
the nature of the offense rather than by the severity
of the penalty attached to certain crimes. In this
way inequities to the individual whose offense has
no relation to his ability to perform the functions
of the office will be avoided and the public interest
will be better served by correlating the quality of
the man himself to the requirements and obligations of his office.
40See note 13 supra.

ABSTRACTS OF RECENT CASES
Francis A. Heroux
Judge's Comments On Defendant's Guilt Prejudicial Error-The defendant was charged with
selling narcotics in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 173,
174. At his trial, the defendant conceded that he
had sold a package to a federal agent which supposedly contained narcotics; however, the defendant claimed that the package only contained
plaster of paris which he palmed off on the agent
to cheat him. A necessary corollary of this defense
was that the defendant had been "framed" by the
agents and that the agents had either fooled the
United States Attorney or else the United States
Attorney was a party to the "frame-up".
During the course of the trial, the district judge
took an active part in questioning the witnesses.
When the defendant took the stand to testify in
his own behalf, the judge developed several lines
of inquiry about the alleged "frame-up". During
this questioning, the judge stopped to comment,
"that he had once been an Assistant United States
Attorney and that it was easy enough to tell when
anagent is trying to frame somebody". Thereafter,

at the close of the trial, the judge in his instructions, while admonishing the jury that they were
the sole trier of facts, told the jury that he personally believed the defendant guilty of the crime
as charged.
The jury returned a verdict of guilty and the
defendant appealed. The United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed and remanded, holding that it was outside the area of
permissible judicial comment for the judge to interject his own personal testimony into the case and
also reversible error for the judge to tell the jury
that he personally believed the defendant guilty of
the crime charged. United States v. Woods, 252 F.
2d 334 (2 Cir. 1958).
Discussing the trial judge's part in the questioning of the witnesses, the court reiterated the
premise -that during the course of a trial a federal
judge is more than a moderator and it is his duty
to develop the facts and to make the proceedings
orderly and comprehensible to the jury. However,
when the judge stated from his own knowledge that
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the jury could not give credit to the defense without imputing to the prosecutor conscious participatioti in the frame-up, he assumed the role of an
expert witness and this exceeded the bounds of
judicial comment. Furthermore, the judge's comment in his instructions that he personally believed
the defendant to be guilty of the crime as charged
was also improper. The government argued that
the comment only related to the issue of credibility
as between the federal agent and the defendant and
thus the instant case would not come under the
rule of United States v. Murdock, 290 U.S. 389
(1933) which prohibits judicial opinions of guilt if
the vital facts are in issue. The government's
theory was based on the fact that the only issue in
the case was one of credibility, and if the judge
could comment on credibility, he could also comment on guilt. The court, even assuming arguendo
that the judge could comment on credibility,
rejected the government's argument. The court
noted a significant difference between expressions
as to "guilt" and expressions as to "credibility,"
especially in view of the impact of the burden of
proof. That is, the trial judge in effect said that he
thought the federal agent's testimony was not only
true, but also constituted evidence of guilt beyond
a reasonable doubt.
Threat Of Mob Violence Held To Be Mental
Coercion-Petitioner, a nineteen year old Negro,
was suspected of the robbery-murder of an elderly
merchant. He was arrested by the police at 11:00
a.m. on October 5 and held incommunicado without any charge being placed against him until the
afternoon of October 7. During this time, he was
questioned continuously about the crime, but he
did not make a confession. Thereupon, the chief of
police stated to the petitioner that there was a
mob of people waiting outside to "get" him, but
that if he would make a full confession the chief
agreed to protect him. In this setting the petitioner
immediately consented to make a statement about
the crime.
At the beginning of the trial the petitioner's
counsel moved to suppress the confession, but the
trial court overruled this motion. This ruling was
appealed and the United States Supreme Court
held that the confession was coerced and its use at
the trial over the petitioner's objection deprived
him of due process of law. Payne v. Arkansas, 78
S.Ct. 844 (1958).
The state argued that the confession was not
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coerced because there was no physical torture involved. The Court rejected this argument, reiterating its stand in Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S.
49, 52, 53 (1949) where it said, "there is torture of
mind as well as body; the will is as much affected
by fear as by force.... A confession by which life
becomes forfeit must be the expression of free
choice." The Court then went on to point out that
the threat of mob violence used by the police
chief created such fear in the petitioner that the
subsequent confession he made was not an "expression of free choice" and thus the confession
was coerced. The Court concluded that the use of
this confession deprived the petitioner of that
fundamental fairness essential to the very concept
of justice, and, hence, denied him the due process
of law guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment.
Evidence That Defendant Drank From Same
Bottle As Negroes Prejudicial-The defendant
was brought to trial for bribing a police officer to
let him maintain a disorderly house. He was convicted and he appealed. One of the grounds urged
for reversal was that evidence had been introduced
at the trial that the defendant had been seen
drinking liquor from the same bottle as Negroes.
The Court Of Appeals of Georgia reversed the
conviction, holding that mention of this fact at
the trial was prejudicial error. Ingram v. State,
103 S.E.2d 666 (Ga. 1958).
The court noted that evidence that drinking was
going on at a disorderly house would be admissible,
but that it was not relevant to show that mixed
drinking had occurred. The court took notice of
the fact that Georgia is one of a minority of states
which holds that mixing of the races is undesirable
and that "the issue of racial integration is fraught
with great emotional tension in the face of Brown
v. Board of Education.. . ." As long as the federal
courts, and this court, held that mention of racial
differences in trials where Negroes were defendants
was prejudicial to a fair trial, the court would
equally protect a white defendant.
Defendant Entitled To New Trial When Court
Reporter Loses Notes-The petitioner was convicted of armed robbery in 1948. He immediately
filed a notice of appeal and received several time
extensions during which he tried to obtain a
transcrip't of the trial for use in a bill of exceptions.
Shortly after the trial the court reporter became
seriously ill and his shorthand notes were lost.

